OBSERVATIONS

ON

MR. PALEY'S THEORY

OF THE

ORIGIN OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT,

AND THE

DUTY OF SUBMISSION.

——Animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur. Alterum nobis cum diis, alterum cum belluis commune est.

SALLUST.

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WHEN intellectual faculties, powerful in themſelves, are applied to trifling inveſtigation or frivolous purſuits, we ridicule whilſt we pity the perverſion: but ſhould the ſame faculties be engaged in oppoſing truth and propagating error, we throw aſide the levity of ſarcaſm, and aſſume the energy of argument.

To this country, fortunate at leaſt in that reſpect, the moſt valuable privileges have been derived, and the happieſt conſequences been deduced from the doctrine of the ſocial

compact. Yet this very doctrine, announced as it was by the wiſdom, acknowledged by the reaſon, and ſuſtained by the firmneſs of our progenitors; this doctrine, which flatters whilſt it protects, and gives us the ſpirit to act, whilſt it takes away the neceſſity of acting, has been often inſidiouſly diſcuſſed, and has been lately directly denied.

Should an individual ſeek to diveſt himſelf of a valuable endowment, or an honourable privilege; ſhould he wiſh to perſuade the world that he is deſtitute of liberal feeling, or manly independence; that he was created for ſubmiſſion, and born to crouch beneath the rod of the firſt of his ſpecies, who ſtyled himſelf his lord——we ſhould be ſtrongly inclined to conſider him as rather eccentric in his opinions, and ſhould probably conſign him to a government as arbitrary, and *a diſcipline as ſevere*, as the *wildneſs of his imagination* could conceive, or the baſeneſs of his ſpirit deſerve.

But ſuch a man would be hoſtile to himſelf alone, he would be content with his own humiliation, and ſatisfied with his own ſhame; he would neither infringe nor impeach the conſequence or the talents of his neighbour; he

he would be the diſgrace, but not the peſt of ſociety. But how malignant is his intention, and how atrocious his crime, who deprives his fellow-citizens of the moſt precious gift, and the moſt ſubſtantial honour, by denying their *right* to freedom. A denial the more to be reprobated, when it is diſguiſed by deducing that right from principles by which it cannot be ſupported, and defending it by arguments by which it muſt be refuted.

The only conſolation which remained to this country, ſhattered and diſmembered as it is, was derived from the enlivening reflection, that the principle of political government, eſtabliſhed at the revolution, had reſiſted every attack, and flouriſhed amidſt misfortunes; that the poſſeſſion of the franchiſe it beſtowed had given dignity to defeat, and in ſome meaſure enlivened the horrors of diſgrace; and that the conviction of our felicity in ſo important an inſtance had mingled a few grains of reluctant envy with the inſulting pity of our foes.

The grand attack upon this celebrated principle ſeems to have been ſomewhat injudiciouſly reſerved for a period like the preſent, when the covenant between the

governors and the governed has been recently ratified by the contracting parties, in terms the moſt unequivocal, and with the moſt poſitive effect. We have ſeen a government diſſolved with the conſent and by the declaration of the people—We have ſeen a number of provinces, independent of each other, and connected only by local ſituation and ſimilar diſtreſs, unite for mutual ſupport, and form a federal aſſembly—We have ſeen the freemen of thoſe provinces relinquiſh their newly-acquired right to ſavage and uncontrolled liberty for the benefit of protection and the advantages of peace—We have beheld an inſtance of the original compact, a ſolution of doubts, and a leſſon to future ages.

In the courſe of the preſent century, and in a neighbouring ſtate, a few enlarged ſpirits, animated with the love of freedom, and convinced of the rights of man, diſdained the trammels of deſpotiſm, and dared to examine the principles of government and the reaſon of ſubjection. Born in a land of ſlaves they thought like freemen, and, thinking like freemen, they admired the conſtitution of Britain; they propoſed it as an example of a political ſyſtem, not adapted to the local circumſtances

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of a particular country, or the genius and prejudices of a ſingular people, but co-extenſive with the empire of reaſon, and congenial with the feelings of humanity. The fate of theſe daring ſpeculations was inevitable; they were reprobated by the tools of power, neglected by the multitude, and venerated by the few who had ſpirit to admire, and reaſon to reflect. It remained for the preſent day to produce an almoſt miraculous alteration in the general ſentiments of the people to whom I have alluded. An arbitrary monarch became on a ſudden the patron of the oppreſſed. Armies, the inſtruments of tyranny, and the ſubverters of juſtice, aſſumed the office of protection; the military enthuſiaſm was for once directed to a noble and intereſting purpoſe. Generals of the armies, and members of the academies of France exulted in the defence of freedom, whilſt they eloquently laboured the panegyrick of its aſſertors, and boldly pronounced the eulogium of its martyrs*.

Inſpired by the example of the people they protected, our neighbours are animated with

* Vid. Les Lettres de Marquis de Chaſtellux.

a glow, and directed by a juſtneſs of ſentiment, which have been long dormant and apparently extinct. They have reſolved to act from the conviction, and not to ſpeculate upon the exiſtence of their rights. They have ceaſed to be dazzled by the ſplendour of the crown, and diſdain to crouch beneath the weight of the ſceptre.

The ſubjects of another ſtate ſeem alſo to have adopted the ſpirit of reſiſtance, to have remembered the glory of their progenitors, and to emulate their generous exertions. It is in this country alone that opinions inimical to the privileges of humanity are promulgated or revived—In this country, the ſeat of liberty and the nurſe of patriots.

The peruſal of Mr. Archdeacon Paley's late publication, as long as he confines himſelf to domeſtic rights and civil relations, muſt eſſentially contribute to the uſeful fund of rational amuſement and important information. By him the natural connexion of the duties and comforts of life is accurately delineated, and ſtrenuouſly enforced. From him

him we may learn to reſtrain the impulſe of paſſion, to cultivate the ſocial affections, and to direct the operations of reaſon.

After an eſtimate of the duties of a man at once ſo juſt and ſo complete, we encouraged an ardent hope, and an almoſt deciſive expectation of the moſt correct, and conſequently the moſt enlarged ſentiments reſpecting the rights of a citizen, and the obligations of a ſubject. We did not indeed anticipate the laboured reſearch of Sydney, the ſage diſcuſſion of Locke, or the penetrating deciſion of Monteſquieu; but contented ourſelves with the proſpect of a ſober comment upon their principles, a diſtinct diſplay of their arguments, and a rational ſubſcription to their opinions.

As theſe hopes are diſappointed, they were perhaps too raſhly entertained. Our veneration for the wiſdom, and reſpect for the authority of thoſe celebrated men, were perhaps the reſult of early prejudice and hereditary bigotry. We will even admit for a moment that *they* embodied the deluſions of ſpeculation, and profaned the purity of truth. But after we have thus conſented to doubt and to ſuſpect, we will extend our ſcepticiſm

and our jealouſy a little farther ; we will aſk, with inquiſitive anxiety, whether perſpicuity has *now* ariſen from confuſion ? Whether our rights are accurately deduced and permanently eſtabliſhed ? And whether the creed of Paley is to be deemed in future the juſt rule, and the unerring guide of the enlightened and orthodox politician ?

What the opinions of mankind may hereafter be, always fluctuating, and frequently abſurd as they are, it is impoſſible to foretell. It is my preſent intention, in conſequence of the taſk I have aſſumed, to examine the doctrines which Mr. Paley has adopted, as far as they reſpect the origin of government, and the duty of ſubmiſſion.

" Government (ſays Mr. Paley) at firſt " was either patriarchal or military, that of a " parent over his family, or of a commander " over his fellow-warriors." That parents in ſome inſtancés aſſumed the rule of their families, and that a warrior was inveſted with military command, antecedent to the regular eſtabliſhment of a ſyſtem of civil government, I readily admit ; but on the other hand, I as abſolutely deny that any legitimate ſpecies of government could poſſibly be derived from the

the exercise or possession of that rule or of that command, without the sanction and the suffrage of those who stipulated to obey.

Though the patriarchal and military governments are thus united, they are in principle completely distinct. The child revered the authority of his parent from the natural relatives of protection and obedience. The tribe submitted to the commands of the chief, whom they themselves had invested with military sway. In the first instance the power was mild, domestic, and confined to the limits of adolescence. In the last, active, extraneous, and indefinitely limited, or extended by circumstances and events. In the first instance, it was inherent; in the last, it was the consequence of selection and appointment.

The power of the parent over the child was derived from infant imbecility, and the inexperience of early youth. It was necessary to enable the parent to warn with effect, and to protect with efficacy, that the child should be compelled by reverence or fear to listen and obey. But when, at the approach of manhood, the son acquired the capacity of self-direction and self-defence, the authority

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of the father naturally ceaſed, and every continuation of it muſt have been the effect of voluntary veneration, and habitual eſteem.

In like manner, at the expiration of the term of hoſtility, when weakneſs condeſcended to ſubmit, or reſentment deigned to be appeaſed, obedience to the commands of the leader was no longer eſſential or required. The victors and the vanquiſhed reſumed their former occupations; they purſued their game, or fed their flocks, without either demanding or admitting the extenſion of occaſional command.

Such appear to have been the meaſure and the limits of the paternal and the military powers. When that meaſure was exceeded, or thoſe limits tranſgreſſed, the exerciſe of the authority became unlawful. It was no longer ſupported by neceſſity or conſent, and conſequently a ſyſtem of civil government to which the duty of obedience is annexed, can never be derived from the weakneſs of mechanical ſubmiſſion, or be founded upon the baſis of inſidious uſurpation.

Let us now, abſtracted from human reaſoning, preſume, with Mr. Paley, that civil government being expedient for the comforta-

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ble exiſtence of mankind, it was the will of Providence that ſuch government ſhould be eſtabliſhed by the extenſion or combination of the patriarchal and military powers. And having ſtated this propoſition, let us now proceed to examine, whether it is free from objection, and untainted with abſurdity.

If the venerable parent, or victorious chief contented himſelf with acquiring and exerciſing a gentle and unaffuming influence over his offspring, or compeers, in their days of peaceful occupation, and domeſtic repoſe, it is clear that a permanent ſyſtem of government could not be eſtabliſhed, nor the duty of ſubmiſſion inculcated by a ſecret and inviſible ſway, that was neither aſſerted nor diſcerned. If the ſame perſonages advanced a ſtep farther, and openly aſſumed, with the pureſt intentions, and for the moſt beneficent purpoſes, the adminiſtration of the affairs of the community, the obedience which was rendered them was rather yielded than exacted, the effect of ſpontaneous reſpect, and not of regular ſubordination. If the people revolted from that obedience, will any one contend that a political tie was diſſolved which had never been knit, or that a moral precept was

infringed,

infringed, which had never been propounded?

It would be ridiculous to diſcuſs the mode of tranſmitting a ſpecies of authority ſo looſe and ineffective as that which we have deſcribed: it would be equally ridiculous to aſſert, that ſuch tranſmiſſion in any degree tended to ſtrengthen and confirm it. A community of adult deſcendants might indeed exiſt at the deceaſe of the anceſtor, if he had not been deficient in longevity and a propagating ſpirit, the uſual and indiſpenſable characteriſtics of a patriarch. A tribute of reſpect and attention might alſo be yielded by the family, after his deceaſe, to the next in ſeniority and experience. But we perceive not in that event the juſt principle of civil government, as long as the reſpect was voluntary, and the attention unexacted.

We muſt therefore purſue the farther expanſion of the patriarchal and military powers, as they operated in conjunction, before we can derive from them the actual eſtabliſhment of a ſyſtem of civil government. We muſt behold the victorious chieftain, dignified with the honours of anceſtry, and crowned with the ſplendour of ſucceſs, aſſume the command

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of his tribe, and aſſert an *almoſt abſolute dominion*. We muſt behold him inveſted with this plenitude of power, acquired and maintained by the *obvious* and innocent arts of * corrupting thoſe who were capable of corruption, and of *removing* * thoſe who had virtue to reſiſt, by the ſimple operation of poiſon, or the ſword. And after this edifying ſpectacle we may at length attain the object of our inquiry—We may behold the degraded ſlave *obey* his imperious lord, with patience that declines to reſiſt, and with ſubmiſſion that dares not murmur.

Such is the deſtructive progreſs we are compelled to trace in ſupport of Mr. Paley's theory, and having ſo traced it, theſe are the queſtions we may be now induced to aſk—Can it be the will of God that men ſhould ſubmit to a government founded on fraud, and ſupported by atrocity? Or is it a moral obligation to yield to a dominion conſtructed on the wreck of every duty of morality? Can it be conducive to our comfort, or expedient from our ſituation, to eſcape the wild inconveniencies of anarchy by embracing the ſteady miſeries of deſpotiſm? Or is it poſſible

* Vid. Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philoſophy.

that

that protection ſhould be derived from oppreſſion, or that ſecurity ſhould reſult from violation?

But there are certain facts, as ſtated by Mr. Paley, upon the exiſtence, or non-exiſtence of which I will be content to try the truth of his theory. If it be true, the ancient ſtate of ſociety in moſt countries, and the modern condition, I do not ſay of ſome, but of the greater part of the uncivilized world, muſt exhibit an appearance which at once illuſtrates and confirms it—If it be true, the earlieſt governments muſt of neceſſity have been monarchical—Theſe poſitions Mr. Paley will not ſurely oppoſe, and it therefore remains to be demonſtrated, by a very general hiſtorical inquiry, that the hypotheſis is completely unſupported by the teſt to which it is ſubmitted.

Antecedent, however, to the proſecution of this inquiry, it is proper to obſerve, that in the courſe of its progreſs, if, at any time, we are preſented with a ſpecies of popular government, it is a ſufficient criterion on which we may decide, that it could not be derived from that which was either patriarchal or military; becauſe the latter, as it has been

juſtly

juſtly aſſerted, were univerſally, and in their eſſence monarchical.

In contemplating the ancient and modern ſtate of the Aſiatic continent, we may diſcover in its oppoſite extremities innumerable and unconquered tribes, who are honourably diſtinguiſhed from the ſlaves of the ſovereigns of the Eaſt. The Scythians and the Arabians have preſerved a character in every age immutably independent. They were enabled, by this ſpirit of independence, to diſſipate the myriads of Cyrus, and to withſtand the progreſs of Pompey. Impelled by the thirſt of ſpoil, and the fury of enthuſiaſm, they followed the banners of Zingis, and ſupported the creſcent of Mahomet; but, diſdaining ſubjection, they retired to the ſolitude, and regained the freedom of their deſarts.

In ſurveying the government of the Arabs with a nicer and more ſcrutinizing eye, we are furniſhed with a ſtill ſtronger argument againſt the reality of Mr. Paley's theory. To a people attached to war, and conſcious of the pride of birth, the recommendation of military merit and ſplendid anceſtry muſt have been felt, it may be preſumed, with ample effect,

and would probably have conduced, if in any inſtance it could conduce, to the eſtabliſhment of monarchical government. But the Arabs, though they admired and reſpected the warlike atchievements of their leaders, aſſociated not ſubmiſſion with admiration, or obedience with reſpect. Though they were accurate in their genealogies, and preciſe in the degree of precedence which was claimed, according to ſeniority, by the reſpective tribes of which their nation was compoſed; the conſequence of the noble individual depended on his own virtue, and was not derived from the honours of his progenitors. It will not therefore be preſumed, that the civil government of the Arabs originated from military or patriarchal influence; and that it claims a nobler original, its republican ſpirit ſufficiently atteſts.

If we quit the wilds of Tartary, and the ſands of Arabia, and penetrate the foreſts of Gaul, Germany, and Britain, we are there preſented with innumerable examples of ſimilar manners and congenial feelings. The ſwarms of uncultivated beings, by whom thoſe extenſive countries were enjoyed or poſſeſſed, however they might vary in domeſtic habits and ſuperſtitious tenets, indiſcriminately agreed

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in applauding the gallant warrior, and in admitting a juſt regard for illuſtrious origin. But the warrior, at the ceſſation of hoſtilities, retained nothing but his glory; and the noble, who was deſtitute of military worth, commanded nothing but reſpect. The regal authority was unknown, the *popular* governors of the reſpective diſtricts were inveſted with civil juriſdiction, and the charms of independence were alike acknowledged on the banks of the Rhine, and of the Thames.

Among the petty nations of Italy, the rivals of the Roman republic, it is in vain that we ſearch for the name of an hoſtile *monarch*. The defeat of a barbarian king, of a Jugurtha, or a Tigranes, is an epoch of importance even in the annals of Rome. But the Roman hiſtorian, prone as he was to amplify, and eager to embelliſh, dared not indulge his inventive faculties, and exalt the glory of a favourite hero, by decorating the rugged leader of the Volſci, or the Samnites, with the trappings of imaginary royalty. He ſcrupled not to introduce his deities inveſted with human characters; but, in deſigning the human character itſelf, he ſketched it as it was.

If we examine for a moment the original

inhabitants of America, in their ancient and preſent ſtate, of rude and undiſciplined manners, we are every where preſented with republican inſtitutions, and republican virtues. The tyranny of Mexico was oppoſed, in its zenith, by the neighbouring communities, who ſtruggled with pertinacious ardour, until the ſlave and the freeman, by the indiſcriminating uſurpation of Spain, were alike blended in common degradation. In modern days, the ſavages of the South and the North, the Chileſe, and the Iroquois, preſerve their characters unchanged, and their freedom uninfringed; they hearken to the old, and follow the brave; but the only obedience they admit is the homage of inexperience to wiſdom, and the tribute that is yielded by the man who aſpires to glory, to him who has acquired it.

By theſe arguments, and theſe deductions, I have attempted to ſhew, and I truſt I have been able to demonſtrate, that when the patriarchal and military powers, however mildly exerted, exceed their natural limits, that exceſs muſt conſtitute uſurpation—That thoſe powers cannot eſtabliſh or be ripened into a regular ſyſtem of civil government, unleſs they are aſſiſted and ſupported by artifice and force—

That

That the moral duty of ſubmiſſion cannot be applied to a ſyſtem thus immorally conſtituted and ſuſtained—That the preſumed efficacy of the powers in queſtion is oppoſed, and not confirmed, by the example of rude and uncivilized nations—And that we are conſequently compelled to impute to civil government an original more worthy, and an operation more complete.

In following Mr. Paley, through the courſe of his explanation of the duty of ſubmiſſion to civil government, we ſhall firſt attempt to demonſtrate the truth, as well as the convenience; the actual exiſtence, as well as the preſumed probability, of that ſacred and important convention, which has been properly, becauſe emphatically, denominated the Social Compact.

As the eſtabliſhment of this principle muſt operate as a complete refutation of Mr. Paley's theory, it is perhaps the cleareſt, as well as the conciſeſt mode of conducting the argument, to aſſume the affirmative propoſition; to commence the attack in the confidence of our own ſtrength, and not to rely upon the weakneſs of our antagoniſt.

If it be aſſerted, that an expreſs compact

between the primitive founders of the ſtate, was never made or entered into in reality—we are prepared with an inquiry, which may operate as an anſwer to the aſſertion—If we deny the exiſtence of the compact, upon what phyſical or political principle can we account for the introduction of popular importance into the ſyſtem of abſolute government? From what endowment of the human heart, from what exertion of diſintereſted policy, can we derive the preſervation of the dignity, the honour, and the ſafety of the multitude, as oppoſed to the ambition, the vanity, and the independence of the prince? Were the people indulged with a gift, when they dared not aſſert a right; or, was the ſlave condemned to emancipation, and inveſted with a privilege which he neither valued nor underſtood?

A jealouſy of the participation of power, and an abhorrence of controul, are inſeparable from the pride, and combined with the independence of our nature. The moſt benevolent heart might realize its feelings; the moſt unclouded intellect might exerciſe its faculties, in providing for the ſecurity of others, by the promulgation of civil inſtitutions,

tions, and the aſſertion of diſtributive juſtice; but the operation of benevolence and prudence, when applied to the admiſſion of political freedom, would at once be intereſting and curious. The deluſion of ſelf-love, and the flattery of ſelf-applauſe, would ſuggeſt to the partial debater, that the effects of benevolence would be more generally extended by the poſſeſſion, than by the diviſion of his authority; and that the efforts of prudence would be more permanent and ſteady, when directed by the firmneſs of an experienced individual, than when abandoned to the indeciſion of a popular aſſembly. That the conſtitution of a controuling power would violate the harmony of the ſtate, and ſubſtitute the turbulence of active inquiry for the calmneſs of implicit ſubmiſſion; and that, from the conviction of the depravity, and in compaſſion for the weakneſs of mankind, it would be cruelty to emancipate, and mercy to enſlave.

Under the gentle tyranny of a benevolent deſpot, the occupations of the ſubject might be ſecure, his property uninfringed, and his perſon inviolate. But in the gift of theſe humble enjoyments, the Sovereign would

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believe that he had ſecured the happineſs of the people; and would impute that happineſs to his own protecting care, and to the prudent firmneſs of his own character. He would not eaſily admit, that there was ſomething which was ſtill denied them; that they were condemned to a dull repetition of animal gratification, and ſenſual indulgence; that the activity of the ſpirit was reſtrained, and the incitements to exertion withheld; that, deprived of the hope of diſtinction, and the reward of ability, they ſlumbered through their days, and departed from the world (like the ſlaves of the Jeſuits* in Paraguay) with the ſame indifference as they exiſted in it.

If there be any weight in this current of argument, deduced, as it is, from the frailties of our nature, and ſtrengthened by the experience of ages; if we admit that the prudence and prejudices of the virtuous uſurper are alike inimical to the rights of man, as the jealouſy and apprehenſions of the more profeſſed tyrant; we are at a loſs to diſcover to whoſe bounty, or to what benign influence, we are to attribute the introduction of that

* Vid. Les Voyages de M. Bougainville.

ſpecies of government, which rouſes the torpid multitude from their ſtate of political annihilation; which gives them leave to think, and inſpires them with courage to act; which opens a ſcope for talents, and provides a reward for application?

Fortunately for mankind, ſuch modes of government have exiſted; fortunately for ourſelves, ſuch a government ſtill continues to exiſt. How then did it originate? From the precaution natural to man to preſerve himſelf from oppreſſion, whilſt he aſſured himſelf of protection; from the means he conſequently adopted of limiting the authority by which he hoped to be ſo protected; and from the reciprocal convention by which the purpoſes of both parties were aſſerted and ſuſtained.

Here then we arrive at what has been emphatically ſtyled the Social Compact. But it is aſſerted, that this compact could never by poſſibility have exiſted; and that it is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that an herd of ignorant ſavages could be brought to deliberate upon a topic ſo intricate and refined. But when the amiable effuſions of paternal care, and filial gratitude, were felt and acknowledged; when a leader was elected to conduct their predatory

incurſions, which preſuppoſes a ſpecification of property, and an acquaintance with ſubordination and ſubmiſſion, the ſame congregation of men, without a greater exertion of intellectual labour, might ſelect an experienced individual for the purpoſe of protecting *that* property, as well as their perſons, from the effects of internal violence; might engage to ſubmit to his decrees, as long as they tended to the purpoſe for which he was inveſted with the power of pronouncing them; and might finally reſerve to themſelves the right of deciding upon his prudence, and his integrity in the execution of ſo important a truſt.

Theſe are the outlines of the Social Compact, rudely, but diſtinctly delineated. Theſe are the principles which may be diſcovered in the traditional records, and habitual practice of nations, not yet emerged from barbariſm; of the nations to which I have before alluded, and of many more to which I might ſtill allude: nor ought we to wonder at their prevalence; they were the natural reſult of the firſt moments of reflection, and the firſt efforts of ratiocination.

We are challenged to produce a complete example

example of the actual ratification of the Social Compact. The demand is in itself insidious, because, under the disguise of a candid appeal to a certain event, it reduces the question to the decision of positive evidence, when, from the nature of the case, it can only be decided by that which is circumstantial. In developing the fact of convention, we must pervade the obscurity of antiquity, and expect elaborate narration amidst the looseness of traditionary annals: we must expect a systematic relation of the transactions of an illiterate people, and suppose them to be actuated by the craftiness of design, whilst they only obeyed the impulse of what may be almost termed the instinct of humanity.

The plain and simple principle of protection and obedience, divested of its various dependencies and infinite relations, was originally considered by a people who retained the right of creating and advising the chief magistrate of the state; by another people, who admitted the hereditary claim of a king, under a less opprobrious denomination, but reserved the transcendant privilege of reprobating his conduct, and stigmatizing his political errors and civil misdemeanors in a free

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and popular convention. By theſe people the relative duties of the governors, and the governed, muſt have been as clearly underſtood, as they were unequivocally admitted; but can we at this day report the proceedings of the aſſemblies, in which the queſtion was debated, or delineate the terms and the formality of ratification?

This correctneſs of political ſentiment was familiar at Athens, and at Rome, in the infancy of their reſpective conſtitutions. The multiplication of ſocial relations, the accumulation of wealth, and the increaſe of national importance, diſcovered ſources of oppreſſion, and temptations to uſurpation, againſt which, the ſimplicity of *thoſe* conſtitutions was by no means adequately framed. The barrier was conſequently extended and ſupported; but the alternate bleſſings and inconveniences of a popular government were by no means derived from the activity of ſedition, or the ſturdineſs of reſiſtance; but were regularly deduced from the freedom of the original eſtabliſhment, the reſult of a juſt and actual convention.

In like manner (and I truſt I do not ſpeak in the character of a political viſionary, but

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from a view of the ſubject not altogether ſuperficial), it is fair to contend with the force of reaſon, and the plauſibility of truth, that the relative duties of protection and obedience, the parents of the Social Compact, were underſtood and acknowledged in our own Iſland, in a remote age, and by an illiterate people. The date and the terms of that compact are inveloped in impenetrable obſcurity; but the ſpirit and the eſſence of it may be diſtinctly deſcried in the conſtitutions of a venerable legiſlature, which even a poliſhed generation may not bluſh to protect from the obloquy of barbariſm*.

By Henry I. they were conſidered as declaratory of the franchiſes of an Engliſhman. In the reign of John, of Charles II. and of William III. the revival of their ſpirit may inſtantly be diſcerned; local uſurpations and temporary grievances were repreſented and removed; but the triumph of popular virtue was completed by the reſtoration, and the aſſertion of the natural rights, and the indefeaſible prerogatives of humanity.

I have here endeavoured to point out the

* Conſtitutions temp. Edwd. Conf.

probable

probable grounds of preſuming; for, except perhaps in a ſingle inſtance, we can now only preſume, that free governments were originally inſtituted by the operation of a convention. In diſcuſſing the conſtitution of our own country, the lapſe of ages, the extinction of documents, and the confined ſpirit of monkiſh annaliſts, reduce us to an aſſertion, that a people conſcious of their rights, and reſolute in defending them, and a ſyſtem of civil liberty to be traced in the remoteſt age, induce us to believe and to maintain, that the conſtitution originated from a compact between the parties; becauſe from ſuch a compact only, can be derived whatever is politically free, and whatever is morally juſt.

It is admitted, that an imitation of a Social Compact may have taken place at a revolution. A revolution, taken in its ſtrict ſenſe, implies a reſtitution of ancient rights, and not an aſſertion of unprecedented pretenſions. A revolution is ſometimes taken for the cauſe, or the effect of the revival of popular claims; it is in fact the actual renewal of thoſe claims. A revolution is ſometimes improperly applied to the acceſſion of a new dynaſty of tyrants, or the ſubſtitution of a domeſtic for a foreign uſurper;

uſurper; in this country it is with more dignity, as well as with more correctneſs, confined to the renovation of the conſtitution, and the aſſertion, as well as the declaration, of the ancient rights of the people.

If this be admitted to be the caſe, it is not a forced conſtruction to contend, that if the prince and the people entered into a mutual convention at the moment of the revival of the juſt principles of the conſtitution, that a convention of a ſimilar nature was actually entered into by the ſame parties, at the æra of its original eſtabliſhment. In the firſt place, it would be prepoſterous to ſuppoſe, that the people aſſerted, as their deareſt and moſt eſſential claims, the franchiſes and immunities which they received in the beginning, from the caprice or condeſcenſion of the prince; and in the next place, it is equally incongruous to imagine that the prince, when he actually conferred a bounty, admitted and complied with a demand.

A revolution may either ſupport the principles, by ſubverting the forms of government; or may confirm the one, whilſt it aſſerts and eſtabliſhes the other. Examples of both theſe conſequences may tend to illuſtrate the ſimi-

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larity of a ſecondary with an original compact, and the mutual ſupport which they reciprocally receive and afford.

In the Seven United States of the Netherlands, the conſtitution, from the earlieſt antiquity, was compoſed of the princes of the reſpective provinces, who poſſeſſed an authority extremely limited, and were adviſed and controlled by an aſſembly of the noble, eccleſiaſtical, and popular eſtates. Theſe provinces at length united under one prince, the monarch of a mighty empire, were oppreſſed, neglected, and inſulted; the moderate principle of their government was invaded; the ſovereign ceaſed to protect, and forfeited his claim to obedience. The national aſſembly rejected his authority, and transferred it under ſtricter limitations to a magiſtrate of a different denomination, and of a more popular deſcription; but they aſſerted the ancient ſpirit of their conſtitution, whilſt they abrogated the form; and were probably endowed with the ſame degree of civil liberty, and political independence under the firſt Stadtholders of the houſe of Naſſau, as under the Counts of Holland, or the Foreſters of Flanders.

In our own country, upon the compelled abdication

abdication of an unworthy Prince, the national aſſembly were convinced of the ſuperior excellence of the conſtitution, of which they compoſed ſo important a part, and preſerved it pure and uninfringed. But when, by their voluntary ſelection, they called a Sovereign to the throne, they expatiated on the culpability of the degraded Prince; they proclaimed by a declaration, compoſed in the terms, and pronounced with the voice of independence, the extent and importance of their rights; and by an implication, if an implication it can be called, when the *words* only were not explicit, they conſented to yield a conſtitutional obedience, as long as they received a conſtitutional protection.

In theſe inſtances, we perceive an expreſs ſtipulation between the people and the executive magiſtrate. I will even admit, that the privileges contended for, were ſuch as had not been before enjoyed, or, having been enjoyed, had been conferred by the bounty of the Prince; but I am ſtill juſtified in aſſerting that they are now ſubſtantially confirmed on the one hand by a poſitive claim, and on the other, by an unequivocal admiſſion.

It will be objected that this cannot be con-

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ſidered as an original compact, becauſe, in many inſtances, ſomething was pre-ſuppoſed. To this I reply, that I mean not to conſider it as an original, but merely as a declaratory compact; a revival, and not an aſſumption of a right; and that the exiſtence of the conſtituent and repreſentative bodies, with their various qualifications and relations, affords the ſtrongeſt argument, and the moſt convincing proof, that it was in fact a renovation, and that the right was originally created by the ſame power by which it was ſubſequently ſupported and maintained.

It is further objected, that theſe acts of the popular aſſembly ſhould have been unanimous; or otherwiſe, that the propriety of ſubmitting to the opinion of the majority ſhould have been proclaimed by a prior reſolution. Reaſon and common ſenſe are pretty equally diſtributed; and, in a queſtion of *actual and general importance*, it is fair to conclude (for the concluſion is juſtified by experience), that the aſſertors of prudence and propriety will conſiderably outnumber the retainers of corruption, the creatures of prejudice, and the fomenters of faction. It was unneceſſary, therefore, to eſtabliſh a principle

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ſo generally known, and ſo ſenſibly adhered to, by a regular debate and a formal deciſion. If we preſume the queſtion to have been actually put, and the aſſembly called upon to decide upon the propriety of ſubmitting to the ſenſe of the majority, the proceſs would have indeed been curious.—Unanimity in the firſt inſtance, or we muſt ſuppoſe the point to have been determined, could alone have been effective: the ſuffrage of millions might have been controlled by a ſolitary *Veto:* by a previous queſtion of a very ſingular conſtruction, and a ſpecies of political arithmetic as ſingularly preposterous, a meaſure of the moſt important magnitude might have been diſpoſed of upon a diviſion, without the labour of argument, or the formality of debate, by the corrupt abſurdity of an ignorant or a profligate *minority.*

The inconveniences which Mr. Paley attributes to the preſumption of fundamental principles in the conſtitution, have in modern times been very effectually removed. Admit the inſtitution and the combination of the ſeveral branches of the legiſlature, and every other conſtitutional point may be derived from the acts of that legiſlature, from the claims of convenience, and the maturity of po-

litical reaſon. The minds of men are no longer agitated *by the doubts of the reign of Charles the Second.* Repeated inſtances have proved, that Parliament may alter or limit the ſucceſſion of the Crown upon maxims of national prudence and ſubſtantial policy, without regarding the once preſumed *fundamental principle* of indefeaſible, divine, and hereditary right. An annual convention, another *fundamental principle*, has been converted into a triennial election. A triennial parliament, by a ſpecies of magic peculiar to itſelf, has more than doubled the term of its exiſtence. A ſeptennial parliament may perhaps, in the progreſs of events, accommodate the period of its duration, by a ſelf-denying ordinance indeed, to the original annual limitation of repreſentative confidence.

Mr. Paley goes on, and objects, that "*If it be by virtue of a compact* that the ſubject owes obedience to civil government, it will follow, that he ought to abide by the form of government he finds eſtabliſhed, be it ever ſo abſurd or inconvenient. He is bound by his bargain."

I readily admit, that in a political as well as in a civil tranſaction, an individual is, and ought to be, bound by the ſtipulations of his

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contract. But Mr. Paley is not to be told, that if a condition be annexed to a contract, and that condition be not performed, the agreement, which depended upon it, is diſſolved. This Mr. Paley himſelf appears to admit, as applying to particular mal-adminiſtration; but then, ſays he, "The *Government* cannot be changed---Deſpotiſm is the conſtitution of many States; and whilſt a deſpotic Prince exacts from his ſubjects the moſt rigorous ſervitude, according to this account, he is only holding them to their agreement."

Let us analyze this argument for a moment, and we ſhall find that the fallacy of it conſiſts in the aſſertion, "that Deſpotiſm is the conſtitution of many States;" that deſpotic power is exerted by many of the Kings of the earth in its moſt abſurd and violent extent, I will admit. To make it the conſtitution of thoſe unfortunate States, in which it prevails, we muſt have recourſe to a *compact* between the parties. But that compact, as I have before obſerved, muſt have been founded upon reciprocal advantage, and conſequently could never have exiſted at the creation of an authority, which received in its origin the right, as well as the power of oppreſſion.

But we will ſuppoſe, and it can only exiſt in ſuppoſition, that ſuch a degree of unbounded authority, was actually veſted by the ſelection of an infant community, unſettled, unexperienced and uninformed, from local circumſtances of miſapplied eſteem and miſtaken veneration, in the hands of a favoured individual. Could ſuch a compact be conſidered as irrevocable? Could ſo extravagant a form of Government be ſupported as ſacred by the people and their deſcendants to the third and fourth generation, becauſe it is the conſtitution of the State? In a tranſaction between man and man, where one of the parties is deceived or betrayed, and where the whole of the probable benefit muſt of neceſſity center with the other, the contract would be annulled; and thus it is, and thus it ever will be with reſpect to a public convention. And ſhould it here be ſaid, that the Social Compact is profeſſedly framed for the advantage of the people, and that, therefore, according to our doctrine it is invalid *ab initio*; we anſwer that this partiality is not to be deemed a contradiction of the private rule; becauſe the conſideration given muſt always be proportionate with the benefit to be received, and at the moment

moment of ratifying the covenant, the people's contribution was immenſe, the Prince's comparatively nothing.

Theſe are the arguments which may be raiſed againſt Mr. Paley's ſecond head of objections to the theory of the Social Compact, upon the ground of its inconvenience. Analogical reaſoning from the principles of civil policy is ever more convincing, and more conſiſtent with ſenſe and prudence, than violent and intemperate aſſertions. It is better to untie the knot than to cut it. I would not willingly pronounce that every right muſt be ſubſervient, and that every rule of juſtice muſt ſubmit to the real or fancied felicity of the people.

Deſpotiſm, whenever it exiſts, is the conſequence of uſurpation, not of compact. Political, like moral, pravity is ſuſtained by the tenacity of cuſtom, and not by the effect of poſitive inſtitution. The Japaneſe mechanically adores the majeſty of a monſter, or an idiot. The New-Zealander as habitually devours the mangled members of his enemy. To aſſert that the *ſlave* is bound to an eternal ſtate of grovelling debaſement, would be as ridiculous as to pronounce it an inconſiſtent

act, were the *ſavage* "to reform and live cleanly as a gentleman ought to do."

Mr. Paley goes on and tells us in the third place, "that every violation of the government on the part of the Governor releaſes the ſubject from his allegiance, and diſſolves the government." I have already admitted that the Political Compact is in general to be judged upon the ſame principles as a civil obligation. But I differ moſt widely from Mr. Paley when he declares, "that the terms and the articles of that Political Compact are no where extant and expreſſed." Liberal protection and honourable obedience may be conſidered in effect, as the terms of the convention. The rights and offices of the adminiſtering power are delegated and preſcribed for the purpoſe of ſupporting the authority of the Sovereign, whilſt it is applied to the welfare of the people; and of inſuring the proſperity of the people, which is to be derived from the protection of the magiſtrate. The conſequence, that reſults from this train of reaſoning, may be compriſed in a ſingle ſentence. The covenant is not broken, nor is the government diſſolved, by the tranſgreſſion of the Crown; unleſs that tranſgreſ-

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ſion is ſo palpably notorious, and ſo atrociouſly violent, as to effect, or at leaſt, to threaten the ſubverſion of the pervading principle of *general* protection, which actuates the political machine, and conſtitutes its eſſence.

The attack, therefore, muſt be ſo deciſive, as to preclude the poſſibility of doubt in thoſe who wiſh to be ſatisfied. Trifling infringements may alarm, and fancied invaſions may be conjured up; but judgment will readily diſtinguiſh the errors of inadvertency from the artifice of deſign, and the raſhneſs of occaſional ſeverity, from the ſteadineſs of ſyſtematic oppreſſion.

Such are the arguments *ab inconvenienti*, which have been arrayed by Mr. Paley, in oppoſition to the doctrine of Mr. Locke. I dare not pronounce whether my feeble ſhafts have pierced the formidable phalanx. To me it will be a ſufficient gratification to have demonſtrated its weakneſs, and to have directed the attack of a more ſkilful or a more vigorous opponent.

The ground of the ſubject's obligation according to Mr. Paley is "The will of God collected from expediency." We are told, that the ſteps by which this argument proceeds

ceeds are few and direct. Let us try theſe ſteps, and ſome of them may perhaps be found, in the courſe of our progreſs, to be not altogether unobſtructed with a degree of ruggedneſs or obliquity.

"It is the will of God that the happineſs of human life be promoted." This poſition, in its nature incontrovertible, I of courſe ſhall accede to with tacit approbation, without attempting that illuſtration which Mr. Paley, although peculiarly qualified for the taſk by the habits of profeſſional practice, has thought it expedient to decline. Proceed we then to the ſecond ſtep. "Civil ſociety conduces to this end; And here, I apprehend, we are preſented with an equivocal term, concealed in the ſimplicity of a plain propoſition, upon which the fabric of ſophiſtry is projected to be raiſed, and by which we are to be conducted to the deſired concluſion.

If the term *Civil Society* be meant to comprehend that barbarous and incomplete ſtate of civil reſtraint, which exiſts under the dominion of deſpotic and ſelf-created power, I totally deny the general validity of the poſition. I am apprehenſive however, that ſuch is intended to be the extent of the principle, becauſe

becauſe it is introduced to ſupport the maxim contained in the concluſion, " that ſo long as the *eſtabliſhed Government* cannot be reſiſted or changed without public inconveniency, it is the Will of God that the eſtabliſhed Government be obeyed."

Nothing in fact can be ſo derogatory to the juſt idea of the wiſdom and goodneſs of Providence, as to ſuppoſe that thoſe attributes can be united in the ſupport, and the defence of the acts of a Nadir Shah or an Hyder Ally; that in any inſtance, or under any circumſtance, there can poſſibly exiſt an obligation to ſubmit for a moment to laws written in blood, and to decrees executed by the ſword. To the arm of deſpotiſm the ſpirit of independence muſt ever be oppoſed; and a perpetual act of reſiſtance muſt become the duty as well as the inclination of the oppreſſed. Opportunities may be waited for, and favourable conjunctures may be attended to, but the principle of a Government repugnant to humanity can never receive the ſanction of divine protection, or participate the effect of a moral obligation.

Let it not be ſaid, that the ſame Providence which permitted arbitrary governments to be

eſtabliſhed over ſo great a part of the earth, impoſed it as a duty upon the ſubjects of ſuch governments to yield a proper obedience. The religion of Mahomet is alſo widely diſſeminated, but it will hardly be aſſerted, that a man who has been inſtituted in the Muſſulman faith is bound to perſiſt in the profeſſion of its tenets; but on the contrary Mr. Paley will probably contend that it is incumbent upon him to ſeize the earlieſt opportunity, without reflecting on danger, or diſgrace, on blood, or on confuſion, to ſhake off the ſhackles of ignorance and infidelity. Even ſo, and correlative with theſe, are the duties of the ſubject or the ſlave of an arbitrary deſpot; acknowledging no tie, it is his duty to ſtruggle for emancipation, without ſhrinking from perſonal danger, and without referring to public inconvenience.

We will however aſſume, that when Mr. Paley ſpeaks of Civil Society and eſtabliſhed Government, he intends to deſcribe that ſtate of Civil Society, which owes its creation and ſupport to ſuch a ſpecies of eſtabliſhed Government, as from the rectitude of its principles *we* may fairly preſume to have originated from a popular inſtitution. This being

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laid down, let us next ſee, in oppoſition to Mr. Paley's aſſertion, whether the doctrine of reſiſtance is not more fully explained and juſtified by the ſuppoſition of a contract, than by the ſubſtitution of *his* favourite principle?

I have already admitted, that reſiſtance is only juſtifiable, becauſe it is only neceſſary, when the meaſure to be reſiſted, appears to be intentionally levelled at the bulwarks of the conſtitution. It is ſurely infinitely more eaſy to decide upon the degree of danger, by a reference to the eſtabliſhed rules of that conſtitution, derived from the ſpirit of its popular original, than by an appeal to the vague and frequently unexerciſed judgment of an undiſcerning individual. It is ſurely a leſs arduous taſk to determine upon a fact itſelf, than upon its conſequences; to pronounce, that a particular act of the executive magiſtrate muſt be oppoſed, becauſe the wiſeſt of our anceſtors have deemed it inimical to the purpoſes of the original compact; than to compute with heſitating doubt the inconveniences of ſubmiſſion on the one hand, and of reſiſtance on the other.

To illuſtrate this argument by an obvious and familiar example,—Suppoſe the executive

Magiſtrate

Magiſtrate ſhould decline, after the diſſolution of a Parliament, to provide in due time for the election and the aſſembling of its ſucceſſor; preſuming this neglect to be an infringement of a mere poſitive inſtitution of the eſtabliſhed Government, and ſetting up the tribunal of private opinion, how variouſly would this innovation be conſidered! how differently would its conſequences be eſtimated! how lightly would they be reſiſted! Every thing would be vague, fluctuating, ſpeculative and inefficacious. On the other hand, if we ſuppoſe the rule, ſo departed from, to be the reſult of a principle inherent in the conſtitution and neceſſary to its exiſtence, and if we ſuppoſe that that conſtitution, having been framed by the people, has a claim to popular ſupport, the propriety of reſiſtance ariſes inſtantly on the notoriety of the fact, and at once demands unanimity, and juſtifies the moſt reſolute deciſion.

I do not mean to reſiſt or to controvert the right of private judgment. I mean only to aſſert that if every political queſtion be conſidered as ſubſtantive, and to be decided upon by itſelf, and by its own merits or defects, the majority of mankind would want a clue

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to conduct them: that upon ſo looſe and deſultory an inveſtigation, coincidence of opinion and reciprocal aſſiſtance could rarely be expected: and that if a rule is to be ſupplied to aſſiſt the defect, and to govern the voice of the people, it can only be deduced from the ſpirit of a popular convention.

Mr. Paley proceeds to point out ſeven inferences from his ſyſtem: But as the propriety of that ſyſtem has been controverted, and its principles, I truſt, refuted, it is unneceſſary to diſcuſs its conſequences. Thus much however I ſhall venture to aſſert—The five firſt of the inferences may be either conſidered as relative to doctrines which have been already denied, to poſitions which it is abſurd to admit, or to concluſions which may be deduced with the ſame propriety from the ſyſtem of Locke, as from that of Paley. Of the two laſt, the firſt involves an ample field for an inveſtigation, to which, a juſt idea of the French Conſtitution would be eſſentially material; and the ſecond engages us in a ſeries of ſubtle diſtinctions and metaphyſical diſquiſition. They are neither of them, however, intimately connected with the principal queſtion in debate; and to examine them as

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they deſerve would require a conſiderable portion of time, and an incongruous expanſion of this part of the preſent inquiry. But leſt I ſhould be conſidered as ſhrinking from the conteſt, I do not ſcruple to announce, that the firſt interval of leiſure from (to me) more important avocations ſhall be devoted to their conſideration.

A queſtion may perhaps be propounded, not by the idle and the diſſipated, but by the buſy and the ſerious portion of mankind. Of what avail, it may be ſaid, is the confirmation of a *ſpeculative* truth, or the detection of a *ſpeculative* error? Will the bleſſings of a benign government be augmented, or will the miſeries of deſpotiſm be averted, by the aſſurance that we are intitled to the firſt by the operation of a contract, and expoſed to the latter by the prevalence of unjuſt controul?

The anſwer to this queſtion may in ſome degree be illuſtrated by a reference to the natural world. At what eſtimation ſhould we rate the powers of a man, who beheld the motion of the planets, and felt the viciſſitudes of the ſeaſons, without indulging a degree of ſpeculation on the rules which guided their courſe,

courſe, and on the principles which inſured their return? It is true that, acquainted with thoſe rules, and inſtructed in thoſe principles, he would continue to ſhrink from the driving ſnow, and to rejoice at the animating ray; but he would the more patiently ſubmit to the inconvenience, and the more feelingly indulge in the gratification, in conſequence of the conviction, that, by the artificial, though apparently diſcordant mixture of natural evil and natural good, he was enabled to ſupport his exiſtence with comfort, and to enjoy it with content.

When a man in like manner partaking the bleſſings and acknowledging the order of a benign and ſalutary policy, but impatient of reſtraint, and indignant at the humility of ſubordination, inſtead of pining in diſcontent, or kindling in ſedition, has recourſe to the calmneſs of inquiry, and the ſteadineſs of reſearch; we may venture to conclude, that he alſo will be gratified with the ſucceſs and rewarded by the event of his labour; that he will diſcover, that the evil he complains of is balanced by the good which it confers; that, by an honourable relinquiſhment of a natural right, he has acquired a more eſſen-

tial advantage; that, by the reciprocal effects of alternate indulgence and reſtraint, the extent of his political happineſs is defined, and its permanency ſecured.

Let us carry on the alluſion a little further; let us ſuppoſe the pervading and inherent powers, by which natural bodies are connected and impelled, and by which they preſerve their form and regulate their courſe; let us ſuppoſe, I ſay, thoſe harmonizing powers, conceived and aſcertained by the vigour of Newton, to be impeached and denied by the ingenious petulance of a more modern philoſopher. Should we readily admit the pretended confutation? Should we not at leaſt demand that the ſubverter ſhould ſubdue the artificer of the hypotheſis, by the force of his conjectures, and by the clearneſs of his demonſtrations?

But a ſchiſm in philoſophy is by no means of ſo dangerous a fabrication, or ſo alarming a tendency, as a political error. A ſpeculator upon phyſical cauſes and effects may deviate from eſtabliſhed opinions, and conſtruct a fanciful ſyſtem; but his ſpeculations muſt conclude with an admiſſion of the harmony and a diſplay of the regularity of nature.

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A political innovator, on the contrary, by raſh ſuggeſtions and unauthenticated aſſumptions, may become the ſubverter of order, and the contriver of confuſion, perplexing all that is intricate, and obſcuring all that is profound.

When a ſyſtem reſpecting the origin of Government, and the duty of Submiſſion, conſecrated by the ſages who compoſed it, exalted by the heroes who ſupported it, and dear from its congeniality with liberal feeling and honourable pride; when a ſyſtem like this is attacked with inveterate hoſtility, we may venture to determine that the ſuppoſed ſucceſs of the attack muſt induce a degradation of general ſentiment, a diminution of individual conſequence, and an humiliation of national pretenſions.

Admitting therefore the ſyſtem of Locke to be as defenceleſs, as it is in fact impregnable: can a man be ſaid to have a claim upon the gratitude of his country, who unfolds a deluſion which gave effect to popular ſpirit, and added dignity to popular councils? That the people of this country ſhould be conſcious of their own importance, and that that conſciouſneſs ſhould be cultivated, and not oppreſſed, is in my apprehenſion a clear and unimpeachable propoſition. It is

by the energy thus acquired, that a corrup miniſter and his venal ſupporters are defeated and diſperſed. It is in conſequence of this political influence, that the baſis of our credit remains unſhaken, and that the enterpriſes of our commerce are juſtified by ſucceſs.

It has been ſaid by thoſe, who by the aſſertion diſgraced their country and themſelves, that the pureſt ſtate of public felicity is to be diſcovered under the adminiſtration of a wiſe, a virtuous, and a deſpotic monarch. If we admit the truth of the obſervation, we muſt admit that it is honourable and prudent to ſubſtitute political indifference for public activity, and the ſmoother accompliſhments of ſubmiſſion for the firmer virtues of controul. It has alſo been ſaid, that the voice of liberty, ſilent on the continent, and faintly murmuring in our own iſland, would ſoon be totally ſuppreſſed. Fortunately for us and for the whole world, the prediction has not yet been accompliſhed; we ſtill attend to the animating ſtrain; and the period is perhaps at hand, when the nations of Europe will be indebted to the ſpirit of our inquiries, and to the deciſion of our reſolves, for private ſecurity and political independence.

FINIS.